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Abstract 
The 2005 reform of the German welfare system introduced two competing organizational models for welfare 
administration. In most districts, a centralized organization was established where local welfare agencies are 
bound to central directives. At the same time, 69 districts were allowed to opt for a decentralized organization. 
We evaluate the relative success of both types in terms of integrating welfare recipients into employment. Com-
pared to centralized organization, decentralized organization has a negative effect on employment chances of 
males. For women, no significant effect is found. These findings are robust to aspects of internal organization 
common to both types of agencies. 
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1  Introduction 
Studies from economics, management, and organization theory suggest that the form of or-
ganization of an institution, particularly the centralization or decentralization of responsibili-
ties, may have far-reaching implications for their outcomes (see, for example, Besley and 
Coate, 2003; Richardson et al., 2002; Hutchcroft, 2001). Also, in the case of welfare admin-
istration, different organizational systems are likely to result in different incentives and strate-
gies and can influence the success of integrating unemployed welfare recipients into employ-
ment. Given that public welfare spending accounts for a significant portion of total govern-
ment expenditure and given that labor market integration of welfare recipients is the principal 
task of the public welfare administration for the unemployed, the improvement of organiza-
tional effectiveness is a question of foremost economic importance.  
One key component in the organization of welfare administration is the degree of local 
autonomy. In a decentralized setting, local authorities are responsible for the activation of 
welfare recipients and act independently from central directives and guidelines. Conversely, 
in a centralized structure, welfare administration is organized by a countrywide government 
agency that issues directives on how the activation of welfare recipients should be imple-
mented at the local level. Theoretical arguments in favor of a decentralized organization are 
based on the idea that local authorities are better informed about the characteristics of the lo-
cal labor market. They are assumed to have detailed knowledge about the specific regional 
attributes relevant for a successful activation process, and, therefore, they are effective in 
providing services that are tailored to local conditions. Centralized organizations, on the other 
hand, are often considered to have an advantage in bundling resources, collecting information 
from various sources, and imposing best-practice strategies for its local offices (see e.g. Finn, 
2000). 
The degree of local autonomy of welfare administration varies considerably across 
countries. In the Netherlands, local authorities form the basis of the public welfare system. In 
the UK, by contrast, public welfare administration is part of the central government structure. 
In other countries, welfare reform has changed the degree of centralization of welfare admin-
istration. The 1996 U.S. welfare reform, for instance, devolved greater program authority 
from the federal level to the states, and the Canadian reform that same year gave greater dis-
cretion to the provinces (Blank, 2002).  
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Even though there is an increasing evaluation literature concerning the effectiveness of 
active labor market programs (ALMP) and certain elements of welfare reform (most of them 
from the United States, Germany, or other European countries), evidence of the effects of the 
welfare system organization is scarce.1 One reason for this is that centralization or decentrali-
zation applies to countries as a whole, which makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of a 
particular organizational setting from other aspects of the welfare system or its reform. So far, 
conclusions are derived from case studies only (see, for example, Lindsay and McQuaid, 
2008; Tergeist and Grubb, 2006). To the best of our knowledge, this is therefore the first 
study to provide a quantitative assessment of the relative performance of a centralized and a 
decentralized organization of welfare administration.  
We exploit the 2005 reform of the German welfare system that introduced two com-
peting types of organization – a centralized and a decentralized one – in an otherwise homog-
enous institutional framework. Both approaches were pursued in parallel for a fixed period of 
time, after which, the more successful model should be determined.2 In most of the 439 Ger-
man districts, a centralized organization was established, in which the welfare agencies are 
subject to the directives and guidelines of the Federal Employment Agency. However, a total 
of 69 districts were allowed to opt out in favor of a decentralized organization that is legally 
and organizationally independent from central directives and guidelines. All other compo-
nents of public welfare and labor market policy – such as benefit entitlements, the tax-benefit 
system in general, and labor market institutions such as minimum wages and employment 
protection – apply equally to the centralized and decentralized systems of welfare administra-
tion.  
Based on a unique data set that is compiled from surveys of welfare administration, 
Federal Employment Agency (FEA) register data, comprehensive surveys of welfare recipi-
ents, and extensive regional information, we evaluate the relative performance of the two or-
ganizational systems in terms of successful integration of welfare recipients into the labor 
                                              
1 For a review of U.S. welfare reforms and the related empirical literature, we refer to Blank (2002), Moffitt 
(2002), and Grogger and Karoly (2005). Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001) synthesize the results of 29 studies 
investigating the effects of various US welfare-to-work programs. German welfare-to-work programs that were 
introduced after 2005 have been analyzed by Hohmeyer and Wolff (2007), Wolff and Jozwiak (2007), Bernhard 
et al. (2008), Boockmann et al. (2009), Aldashev et al. (2010), Huber et al. (2010), and Thomsen and Walter 
(2010a). Surveys on welfare reforms in Europe are provided by Torfing (1999), Kildal (2001), and Halvorsen 
and Jensen (2004) for the Nordic countries, Finn (2000), Beaudry (2002), and Dostal (2008) for the UK, and 
Finn (2000) and Knijn and van Wel (2001) for the Netherlands. See also Martin and Grubb (2001) and Kluve 
(2010) for comprehensive overviews. 
2 This setting was introduced in the so-called experimentation clause in Chapter 6 of Book II of the German 
Social Code (Sozialgesetzbuch Zweites Buch, SGB II). A description of the experimentation clause with details 
of implementation, context and policy results is provided by Deutscher Bundestag (2008). 
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market. For our purpose, successful integration means that an unemployed welfare recipient 
takes up employment without receiving public welfare transfers any longer.3 To estimate the 
effect, we apply a propensity score matching estimator that controls for all selective influ-
ences between both types of organization. We use specifications with different sets of covari-
ates included in the propensity score. In all cases, the results indicate a very good matching 
quality; in addition, the estimation results of treatment effects are robust with respect to dif-
ferent specifications.  
The estimated effects show that decentralized welfare agencies are less successful than 
centralized welfare agencies in placing male welfare recipients in employment; for female 
welfare recipients, the point estimates are also negative, but mostly not statistically signifi-
cant. Hence, gender differences in the effects can be established. We also estimate the effects 
for persons living as singles and persons in non-single households separately. Since the Ger-
man welfare system explicitly targets the household, there is a coincidence between the rele-
vant unit for welfare and employment only for households of single persons. The results tend 
to be more pronounced for singles. Finally, given the relative success of centralized agencies, 
we investigate whether the success hinges on centralization itself or is due to internal organi-
zation features by exploiting data on the organizational strategies applied in the welfare agen-
cies. We find that the significant negative effect of decentralized welfare agencies on em-
ployment for men is largely robust to the inclusion of further information on organizational 
strategies. The better performance of centralized compared to decentralized welfare agencies 
therefore relates to inherent differences between the two types of organization, and not to the 
adoption of particular forms of internal organization.  
 
2  The German Welfare Reform of 2005 
Before 2005, the same organization of welfare administration applied to all 439 districts (in 
German, Kreise and kreisfreie Städte) in Germany. There were two different types of welfare 
benefits: Unemployment and social assistance, which were administered by two different au-
thorities. The centrally organized FEA, represented by the local employment offices, was in 
charge of unemployment assistance, a means-tested benefit for long-term unemployed indi-
viduals whose claims to unemployment insurance benefits had expired. In contrast, local au-
                                              
3 This definition does not preclude that the employer receives public employment subsidies for hiring. Since 
German hiring subsidies were found to give rise to huge deadweight effects (Boockmann et al., forthcoming), we 
feel justified to neglect the distinction between subsidized and non-subsidized hiring.   
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thorities were responsible for social assistance, a benefit for individuals who were not eligible 
for unemployment assistance or unemployment insurance benefits. This organization of the 
welfare system, with its two distinct administrative bodies, was often judged as overly frag-
mented (Tergeist and Grubb, 2006; Eichhorst et al., 2010) and resulted in disincentives with 
respect to integration into the labor market. 
In January 2005, the welfare system reform merged unemployment and social assis-
tance into a single benefit, the so-called Unemployment Benefit II (UBII), to remove the 
shortcomings mentioned above. In contrast to unemployment assistance, and similar to the 
former social assistance, UBII is not conditional on former earnings. To be eligible for UBII, 
persons must be aged between 15 and 64 and must be able to work for at least 15 hours per 
week. Means-testing takes into account the wealth and income of all individuals living in the 
household. Individuals who are employed but have insufficient household income are also 
eligible for the benefit. Recipients of UBII are obliged to actively look for work and to partic-
ipate in the welfare-to-work programs that are assigned to them. An important part of the re-
form was the reorganization of the welfare agencies: After the reform, for each district, all 
welfare services (benefit payments, counseling, labor market activation, etc.) were provided 
by one welfare agency, as opposed to the previous division of tasks and responsibilities be-
tween two administrative entities.  
However, there was no political consensus on where the new welfare agencies should 
be established: Within the system of the centralized FEA or decentralized, at the level of local 
authorities. Ultimately, the legislator mandated a policy experiment and the evaluation of the 
relative performance of the two competing models. In the majority of the 439 German dis-
tricts, local employment offices and local authorities formed a joint venture that is subject to 
the central controlling standards of the FEA (centralized agencies; in German: Arbeitsgemein-
schaft (ARGE)). Within the joint venture, the FEA is in charge of the administration of bene-
fits, job placement, and the application of the main instruments of ALMP. In particular, 
guidelines for these aspects and technical standards as computer software of the FEA are 
binding for centralized districts. Local authorities are in charge of administering payments for 
housing costs and for additional needs. Moreover, they provide counseling in specific con-
texts such as lone parent families, home care for elderly or disabled relatives, or alcohol and 
drug addiction.4  
                                              
4 A variant of this model arose where the local employment office and local authorities could not agree on form-
ing a joint venture. In 19 out of 439 cases, both institutions continued to work separately in the district. Howev-
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Out of the 439 German districts, 69 were allowed to opt for a decentralized organiza-
tion of welfare administration (decentralized agencies, in German: zugelassener kommunaler 
Träger (zkT)). Under this system, local authorities autonomously operate the entire activation 
process including counseling, benefits disbursement, job placement, and the allocation of 
benefit recipients to ALMP. In particular, local welfare agencies are legally and organization-
ally independent from central directives and guidelines in the decentralized system.  
< Include Table 1 about here > 
Table 1 summarizes the key characteristics of centralized and decentralized welfare 
agencies. Decentralized welfare agencies can adopt their own organization and integration 
strategies, and are not bound to central directives. On the other side, centralized agencies are 
subject to central directives and codes of best-practice.5 In both the centralized and the decen-
tralized systems, the largest share of welfare payment is financed by the federal government; 
only a small fraction of overall expenditure – identical in all districts – is taken from local tax 
budgets. This is different from reforms in other countries, where budgets have been shifted to 
local authorities as part of the decentralization process. We are therefore able to investigate 
the effect of decentralized organization independently of budgetary matters.  
To evaluate the relative performance of both regimes, it is important to understand selec-
tion of districts into the two types. The number of decentralized districts (69) is equal to the 
number of deputies in the Bundesrat, the second chamber of the German Parliament. Each 
federal state could have between three and six decentralized districts, corresponding to its 
number of deputies in the Bundesrat. Within each state, districts could apply to opt out of the 
centralized system. In cases of excess demand, the state government made a selection from 
the applying districts. In several federal states, the maximum number of districts that could 
opt for decentralized organization was not exhausted. The vacant places could then be filled 
by the districts not selected from other states in the first round. With respect to the regional 
distribution of applications, it appears that the selection process was strongly influenced by 
political affiliations of the state governments. In two states, Lower Saxony and Hesse, where 
the conservative governments were strongly in favor of the decentralized system, 13 districts 
were allowed to opt out, even though these states only had 6 and 5 seats in the Bundesrat, 
                                                                                                                                             
er, because tasks are shared in a similar way as in the case of the centralized system, we do not differentiate 
between these two types in the empirical analysis.  
5 As will be shown in section 6, the organizational independence of decentralized agencies leads to considerable 
variance in the implemented integration strategies. 
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respectively. In contrast, hardly any districts were proposed from Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania or Rhineland-Palatinate, both of which were run at that time by social democrats. 
Hence, the rules for selection resulted in a concentration of decentralized agencies in certain 
states (WZB et al., 2008).  
 On 1 January, 2012, a further 41 welfare agencies were admitted to choose the decen-
tralized organization. This points to the fact that many counties and municipalities found it 
attractive to engage in counseling welfare recipients, building up on the experiences they had 
made before 2005. The move to the decentralized model by some municipalities was further 
pushed by the uncertainty whether the centralized model would be constitutional6 and reports 
of differences in approach between the public employment service and local municipalities.  
 
3  Description of the Data 
3.1 The Estimation Sample 
In order to investigate whether centralized or decentralized welfare agencies are more suc-
cessful in integrating welfare recipients into employment, we use a unique data set that was 
specifically created for this research question.7 For a random sample of 51 out of 69 decen-
tralized agencies, the aim was to identify regional units that were comparable in terms of la-
bour market characteristics prior to the reform, but chose the centralized organization after the 
reform.  The motivation for this is that although evidence suggests that the adoption of a de-
centralized system was driven by the political affiliation of the state governments (WZB et al., 
2008), some association could remain between local labor market characteristics and the opt-
out from centralized welfare administration. Therefore, the distribution of regional character-
istics is accounted for in the sampling procedure, leading to a data set of 154 pre-selected dis-
tricts (out of a total of 439 German districts): the 51 decentralized welfare agencies sampled 
and 103 centralized welfare agencies selected on the basis of comparability.  
The selection of comparable districts is explained in detail in Arntz et al. (2006).8 
Based on a comprehensive description of the regional labor market situation until 2004 (be-
fore the reform took place), the authors chose variables that are relevant (i.e. significant at the 
                                              
6 The German Constitutional Court had ruled in December 2007 that the form of cooperation between the public 
employment service and local authorities that had been chosen by most centralized agencies violated the consti-
tution (2 BvR 2433/04; 2 BvR 2434/04).  
7 Parts of this data set are publicly available as a scientific use file at the Federal Employment Agency. See Oer-
tel et al. (2009) for details on data access. 
8 The study by Arntz et al. (2006) was conducted to prepare the evaluation of the welfare reform.  
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2.5% level) to the transition of the long-term unemployed into the labor market Among oth-
ers, these include the local unemployment rate, the share of  long term unemployed,  the crea-
tion of job vacancies, the share of individuals on welfare, local GDP, population size and ur-
banization, local transfer payments, and active labor market policies. In a second step, the 
authors used this reduced set of relevant regional variables to identify districts that are (apart 
from the different forms of organization) comparable in terms of labour market outcomes of 
long-term unemployed. To this purpose, they applied the matching algorithm suggested by 
Zhao (2004. The latter defines the matching distance between two districts as the sum of a 
weighted difference in the districts' regional variables, where the weights are a function of 
each variable's predictive power with respect to the individual labour market transition, such 
that more relevant characteristics obtain a higher weight.  
Appendix 1 illustrates the regional location of the districts in our sample. Appendix 2 
shows that the matching of regions equalizes the (unweighted) means and distributions of the 
relevant regional variables over the 154 agencies of our sample. The table reveals that equali-
ty of means and distributions cannot be rejected for the majority of the variables. The only 
exceptions are some variables that depend on the degree of urbanization of the district such 
as, for example, the share of commuters, the rate of social assistance recipients, and the ratio 
of working population to resident population. Here, the mean in centralized districts is slightly 
higher than it is in decentralized districts. In Germany, individuals in urban areas tend to have 
longer durations of welfare recipience than rural areas (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2010). We 
will account for the possible effects of these differences in the estimation below. 
 
3.2 Available Information 
To obtain data on the organizational structure of the welfare agencies, repeated interviews 
were conducted with the agencies’ management and staff in the 154 sample units. These sur-
veys have been used to build aggregate measures of the type of case management, the activa-
tion concept, the placement strategies, and the mix of ALMP. In addition, a wide range of 
regional variables (e.g., unemployment rates, welfare ratios, GDP, population density, share 
of foreigners, etc.) were collected on district-level for several months before and after the 
2005 reform. 
The individual-level data consist of a survey of welfare recipients who were registered 
at the 154 agencies. Between January and April 2007, 100 to 300 telephone interviews were 
conducted within each agency; the number of interviews depended on the size of the welfare 
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agency. In total, nearly 20,300 individuals were interviewed who were drawn from the stock 
of UBII recipients in October 2006. This sampling scheme could impose a difficulty for the 
estimation of the relative effects of decentralized and centralized welfare agencies since the 
sample was not drawn in January 2005 (when the reform was introduced) but in 2006, i.e. 
more than one year after the implementation of the reform.9 The reason for this delay is that 
the disruptions caused by the reform created considerable problems for the quality of adminis-
trative data during several months after the introduction of the reform. This particularly ap-
plied to decentralized welfare agencies, which continued to use their local computer systems. 
In principle, an interface for data collection was provided by the FEA, allowing these welfare 
agencies to interact directly with the FEA’s mainframe computers. In practice, however, the 
adoption of the interface was incomplete until the second half of 2006. Centralized agencies, 
on the other hand, had issues with a newly introduced software system. For these reasons, the 
quality of the data during the early periods after the reform is insufficient for empirical analy-
sis. Therefore, we rely on data from 2006 and 2007. Because a large share of UBII recipients 
depend on welfare benefits for an extended period of time, the stock sample covers those in-
dividuals for whom the organization of welfare administration matters the most.  
The survey data include individual characteristics (gender, age, marital and parental 
status, education, health and disability status, migration background, etc.), information on 
members of the household (number and age of household members and respondent’s relation 
to them), and details concerning the labor market status and labor market history (current la-
bor market state, former spells of insured and minor employment, former spells of unem-
ployment, receipt of welfare benefits, participation in activation programs). Moreover, infor-
mation is available about basic skills (e.g. reading, writing, math, and computer skills), further 
qualifications (e.g. driver’s license), job search activities, and the concessions that respond-
ents would be willing to make in order to obtain a new job.  
The survey data were linked with administrative data from the FEA at the individual 
level. The administrative data include daily information about periods of employment and 
unemployment, job seeking, participation in ALMP, and benefit receipt. This information 
allows for the construction of comprehensive labor market histories of the sampled individu-
                                              
9 The composition of welfare recipients in the districts could, to some extent, itself be an outcome of decentral-
ized or centralized organization at this point of time. If, for example, the centralized system were faster in inte-
grating welfare recipients with good employment prospects in the early periods after the reform, the stock of 
welfare recipients in 2006 may contain fewer welfare recipients with favorable characteristics than in decentral-
ized districts. Potential compositional differences of welfare recipients are considered in the estimation, by tak-
ing selection at the individual level into account. 
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als. An overview of the available information is given in Table 2. However, no information on 
social assistance is available for the time before 2005. Due to the decentralized administration 
of social assistance (see above), there were no uniform standards of data collection and stor-
age. This also fostered the need to conduct the large-scale survey.  
< Include Table 2 about here > 
The information used for the outcome variable is also provided by the FEA and indi-
cates for each month between January and December 2007 the employment status of individ-
uals.10 We define employment without welfare receipt as the outcome of interest. In this case, 
gross labor earnings (plus any income from other sources such as capital earnings) exceed the 
income threshold which limits eligibility for welfare benefits.11 Because our analysis focuses 
on integration into employment, we restrict the sample to individuals who were unemployed 
at the time they entered the welfare system and at the time of sampling. Furthermore, we re-
strict the data to persons aged between 18 and 57 years. Persons aged 58 or older are no long-
er required to actively search for employment but may remain on welfare benefits until they 
reach the official retirement age of 65. Individuals aged 15 to 17 years are subject to compul-
sory schooling and cannot be expected to take up employment. Due to these restrictions, we 
have 13,286 observations in the estimation sample (4,489 persons from districts with decen-
tralized welfare organization and 8,797 from districts with centralized organization).  
 
4  Estimation Approach  
4.1 Estimation of the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
To evaluate the relative performance of decentralized versus centralized organization on the 
individual level, the organization of the local welfare administration is used as treatment vari-
able, denoted by D. Accordingly, D = 1 if an individual is registered at a decentralized wel-
fare agency and D = 0 otherwise. The corresponding potential outcomes are denoted Y1 and 
Y0. Our estimand of interest is the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT), defined as  
ATT = E(Y1−Y0|D=1) = E(Y1|D=1) − E(Y0|D=1). (1) 
To identify the ATT, the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) must hold (Lechner, 
2001) so that conditional on observable covariates X, the potential outcome Y0 is independent 
                                              
10 Due to the proprietary nature of the data the horizon of December 2007 is given. 
11 The administrative data only contain information regarding employment that is subject to social insurance 
contributions. Therefore, our outcome variable does not include spells of minor employment or self-
employment. The outcome variable is measured as a binary dummy variable. 
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of the organizational model. Furthermore, we need to invoke the Stable Unit Treatment Value 
Assumption (SUTVA, Rubin, 1986), ruling out cross-effects between welfare agencies.12 
For estimation, we use kernel density matching on the (estimated) treatment propensi-
ty score Pr(D=1|X) with bootstrapped standard errors and 250 replications (see Heckman et 
al., 1999 for an overview on ATT estimation with matching).13  The estimator weights the 
control observations according to their “distance” (in terms of the propensity score) to the 
treated individuals by means of an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 0.06.14 Individu-
als residing in the same district are affected by common shocks, which may affect the effi-
ciency of the estimates (see, e.g., Moulton, 1986; 1990). We account for this by estimating 
clustered standard errors at the agency level using the non-overlapping block bootstrap.  
 
4.2  Plausibility of the CIA: Specification of the Propensity Score 
To estimate the causal effect of decentralized welfare administration on individual labor mar-
ket outcomes, we have to rule out selective participation in treatment. The most common 
types of selectivity in the evaluation of labor market policies are self-selection and selection 
by a caseworker into the program. In our case, these types of selectivity are very unlikely. 
From the welfare recipients'/caseworkers' point of view, the 2005 welfare reform is an exoge-
nous event that cannot be easily influenced or avoided. The only way to select into treatment 
would be to move to another district. However, welfare recipients usually cannot afford to 
relocate and are not encouraged to move as long as they remain on welfare. Another possible 
self-selection concerns the inflow into welfare receipt. UBII recipients have to be able to work 
for at least 15 hours a week. In determining whether claimants meet this requirement, welfare 
agencies possess a considerable degree of leeway. If ability criteria differ systematically be-
tween centralized and decentralized welfare agencies, this may result in a different composi-
tion of welfare recipients with regard to characteristics such as illness or disability. In a simi-
lar manner, different distributions of welfare recipients between centralized and decentralized 
agency districts may result from the sampling scheme (see above).15 
                                              
12 This requires the regional labor markets to be sufficiently separated so that the job placement rate of one wel-
fare agency does not come at the cost of another agency. This has been checked by IFO and IAW (2008), and the 
findings indicate robust evidence that SUTVA holds. 
13 According to Abadie and Imbens (2008), bootstrapped standard errors are unbiased for kernel matching (due 
to the smoothness of the objective function). 
14 We use the matching algorithm provided by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). 
15 Different behavior of agencies with respect to inflow and activation can lead to selection at the individual 
level. To avoid composition bias, it is therefore necessary to control for individual characteristics. This applies to 
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In order to solve these potential problems, our matching approach relies on compre-
hensive set of individual characteristics, because by conditioning on the latter we naturally 
obtain balancing of the distributions of welfare recipients’ characteristics across districts with 
centralized and decentralized welfare agencies. We have access to socio-demographic charac-
teristics beyond the standard set of controls such as migration background, basic mathematics, 
literacy and computer skills, self-assessed working capacity (measured in hours per day), and 
obstacles to employment such as provision of long-term care of relatives. In addition, detailed 
information on the labor market history of each individual, including frequency and duration 
of employment, unemployment, job seeking activity, ALMP participation, and benefit receipt 
between 2001 and 2004 as well as on the recent labor market state is available. Direct 
measures of individual motivation and attitudes are not included, but it is likely that these 
characteristics are relatively persistent over time. For this reason, it is crucial that we are able 
to condition on individual employment histories in a detailed manner.16 Thus, we are confi-
dent that our rich data include the factors importantly affecting both the treatment and the 
outcome.17 
Given the large number of control variables available and the issue that including ir-
relevant covariates may make propensity score estimation nosier, we choose different specifi-
cations in order to check the robustness of the estimated treatment effects. The first specifica-
tion contains the most important individual characteristics (age, schooling, migration back-
ground, household size, number of children, obstacles to employment, and several indicators 
for labor market history) as well as the duration of the current welfare spell and limited re-
gional information.18 Based on the results of balancing tests, this parsimonious specification 
is our preferred choice. To the latter, we add further regional information in the second speci-
                                                                                                                                             
all studies where the sampling date is after the treatment, even in case of random treatment. This is the reason 
why we do not only make the districts with centralized and decentralized agencies comparable before the reform 
in 2005, but also take into account that the distribution of individuals might have changed since the start of the 
reform when measuring the effectiveness of the two systems. 
16 This is also emphasized by Card and Sullivan (1988) and Heckman et al. (1998). 
17 Our data even exceed the set of information used by Lechner and Wunsch (2011) to analyze the sensitivity of 
matching-based evaluations with respect to the availability of control variables. Their results indicate that pre-
treatment outcomes, caseworker assessments, labor market histories, health status, short- and long-run employ-
ment histories, the timing of unemployment, and job search behavior is required for the CIA to be fulfilled. 
18 The duration of the welfare spell is measured as the number of months on welfare benefits before the sampling 
date. Due to the time span between sampling and interview date, not all individuals report a starting date of wel-
fare receipt before the sampling date. Some left and re-entered the welfare system during fall and winter 
2006/2007 and thus report a starting date after the sampling date. For these individuals, the duration variable is 
set to zero. An additional dummy variable takes these late starting dates into account. 
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fication. The third specification contains the full set of covariates. Descriptive statistics for all 
variables included in the different propensity score specifications are provided in Appendix 3. 
A proper control for regional characteristics is highly important because otherwise, the 
estimated effect of decentralized welfare agencies would capture the effect of regional charac-
teristics not accounted for. To further check the robustness of our findings, we limited the 
sample to 35 decentralized agencies directly bordering a centralized agency. For each of these 
35 areas, we performed the same matching analysis as for the whole sample and chose the 
average of the regional treatment effects as our estimator. In addition, we used the regional 
matching approach described in Arntz et al. (2006) in order to form groups of comparable 
welfare agencies and repeated our matching analysis. In both cases, the averages of the treat-
ment effects estimated are very similar to the effects presented below.19  
Since many evaluation studies have found the effectiveness of labor market activation 
to differ between gender (see e.g. Bergemann and van den Berg, 2008, for a survey on recent 
findings for Europe), all estimations are done separately for men and women. Furthermore, 
note that activation by welfare agencies targets households as a whole. Only for single house-
holds, this is the unit which may also be integrated in employment. For this reason, we also 
look at single and multi-person households separately. The results for the propensity score 
models with the preferred specification (baseline specification) are given in Appendix 4.20  
 
4.3  Balancing Quality of the Matching Estimator 
To assess the quality of matching, we apply four balancing tests: (1) the t-test for mean 
differences in each of the covariates included in the propensity score between matched indi-
viduals in centralized and decentralized agencies, (2) the standardized difference test of Ros-
enbaum and Rubin (1985), (3) re-estimation of the propensity score in the matched sample 
and checking whether the explained treatment variation is close to zero as measured by the 
McFadden-R2 (see Sianesi, 2004), and regressing each covariate on a 4th order polynomial of 
the propensity score, the treatment indicator, and the interaction between both and testing 
whether the coefficients on the interaction are jointly zero (see Smith and Todd, 2005). 
< Include Table 3 about here > 
                                              
19 Results for this robustness analysis are available on request from the authors. 
20 A complete set of estimation results of the propensity score models can be provided by the authors on request. 
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As can be seen from the results of the balancing tests depicted in Table 3, matching 
quality is very satisfactory.21 According to Table 3, the mean standardized difference in per-
cent is strongly reduced after matching. The McFadden-R2 estimates of the third test are al-
most zero after matching and almost all of the variables included in the propensity score mod-
el pass the Smith and Todd (2005) test. In addition, Appendix 3 shows that the equality in 
means of variables in the propensity score specification between individuals in centralized 
and decentralized agencies cannot be rejected in just about any case. 
 
5  Empirical results 
Before presenting the estimation results, we briefly describe the development of our outcome 
variable, employment without welfare receipt, where we distinguish between individuals who 
are registered at centralized and decentralized welfare agencies (see Figure 1). For men, em-
ployment rates in districts with centralized welfare agencies are larger than they are in dis-
tricts with decentralized organization. By December 2007, we observe a mean difference of 
about one and a half percentage points between decentralized and centralized welfare agen-
cies (16.8% for centralized and 15.2% for decentralized welfare agencies). There is no differ-
ence between the two organizational models for women.  
< Include Figure 1 about here > 
Our econometric analysis is consistent with these descriptive findings. As discussed in 
Section 4, we use three different specifications of the propensity score (with baseline denoting 
the preferred specification). The estimated treatment effects of decentralized welfare agencies 
are presented in Figures 2 and 3 for both men and women. Rather than showing treatment 
effects at a single observation date, we display their evolution over the course of 2007, the 
year after sampling.  
For men, we observe a negative treatment effect, i.e. decentralized welfare agencies 
are less successful than centralized agencies in placing welfare recipients in jobs that provide 
a sufficient living income. The absolute effect rises from one to over three percentage points 
from January to August 2007, and declines moderately thereafter. These magnitudes are 
slightly larger than the descriptive evidence presented in Figure1. The effects for May to No-
vember are significant at the 5% level, with t-statistics ranging from 1.96 to 2.91. With the 
                                              
21 The corresponding results for the samples of singles and non-singles are given in Appendix 5 and Appendix 6. 
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exception of April, the effects for the other months are significant at the 10% level. The inclu-
sion of further covariates leaves the estimated effects virtually unaffected (see Figure 2). 
< Include Figure 2 and Figure 3 about here > 
Given the relatively small fraction of people taking up employment (Figure 1), the ef-
fects for men are substantial. The largest estimated effect of nearly -3.5 percentage points, 
estimated for August 2007, implies that decentralized agencies have an about 24% lower inte-
gration quota than centralized agencies. For women, we also find negative treatment effects, 
which are however smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant (see Figure 3). 
Again, the results are insensitive to the specification of the propensity score.   
Gender differences are also present when we split the sample into single and non-
single households (see Figures 4 and 5 providing estimated treatment effects based on the 
baseline specification of the propensity score models). For single men, we estimate a substan-
tially negative employment effect of decentralized welfare agencies. The negative effect 
amounts up to 4.5 percentage points in absolute terms. For single women, we observe a nega-
tive treatment effect, too. This effect, however, is only slightly significant at the beginning of 
our observation period. Thereafter, it is insignificant and of smaller magnitude than the effect 
found for single men. In case of non-single men, we estimate a negative treatment effect of 
decentralized welfare agencies which has an absolute value of up to 2.9 percentage points. 
This effect is of smaller magnitude than the effect found for single men, but it is larger than 
the effect for non-single women. For the latter subgroup, we cannot establish a significant 
treatment effect. 
< Include Figure 4 and Figure 5 about here> 
To discuss potential reasons for the gender differences in our results, we refer to the 
study of IAQ et al. (2009). This study combines analyses of survey and administrative data 
with case studies within welfare agencies. It shows that women are less intensively activated 
than men, irrespectively of the agency type. In particular, women are less frequently assigned 
to ALMP programs than men (see also Thomsen and Walter, 2010b, and Boockmann et al., 
2011).  
 In addition, according to Chapter 10 of Book II of the German Social Code, parents of 
small children under the age of three years may not be activated at all. According to the re-
sults of IAQ et al. (2009), many more mothers than fathers make use of the option to with-
draw from active job search. Case study evidence also suggests that activation efforts of wel-
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fare agencies further differ between genders for efficiency reasons (IAQ et al., 2009). Due to 
limited time resources of the caseworkers and the overall goal to realize as many transitions to 
employment as possible, activation is mainly targeted to the most easy-to-place individuals. In 
most cases, welfare agencies assume that men are the easy-to-place individuals. If women are 
much less intensively activated than men or even not activated at all, we would not expect any 
significant difference in the success of decentralized and centralized welfare agencies to inte-
grate female welfare recipients into employment without welfare receipt. Differences can only 
be present for individuals who are subject to activation like men. Thus, the findings of IAQ et 
al. (2009) and other studies might explain why we observe gender differences in our results. 
 
6  A Glance into the Black Box of Welfare Administration 
The significant treatment effect for men raises the question of why centralized organization 
performs better in placing welfare recipients into jobs. Is the relative success of centralized 
agencies due to their use of more successful organizational approaches and strategies that 
could also be adopted by decentralized agencies as well? All centralized welfare agencies are 
subject to central FEA guidelines, central controlling, and certain directives regarding the use 
of activation strategies. Nevertheless, welfare agencies have leeway in the way they internally 
organize their services for welfare recipients. The implementation of organizational approach-
es is not specific to either administrative model, and we observe variations within both agen-
cies with different organizational features. In the following, we analyze the effect of the 
adopted approaches and strategies and check if they are able to explain the positive effect of 
centralized organization.  
In order to do so, we exploit data on the organizational strategies applied in the welfare 
agencies. According to studies conducted to evaluate the implementation of Germany's 2005 
welfare reform (IAW and ZEW, 2008; WZB et al., 2008), the following features are the most 
important elements in the internal organization of tasks and the cooperation with external 
partners:22 
                                              
22 The effects of further characteristics and strategies of the welfare agencies are considered in ZEW et al. 
(2008). They include variables relating to the agencies’ staff (such as qualification, previous experience, type of 
contract), to the local network (e.g. cooperation with the unemployment insurance system), to the agency’s fi-
nancial resources, to the stated objectives of activation and to the welfare agency’s sanctioning policy. Further-
more, treatment effects of certain active labour market programmes (public employment schemes, short-term 
training and qualification measures) were estimated separately for centralized and decentralized districts.  
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1) Generalized case management for all clients as opposed to case management 
by specialized staff for clients with multiple obstacles to employment, 
2) Integration of activation and placement as opposed to the separation of these 
functions, 
3) Use of customer segmentation procedures, 
4) Establishment of an employer service, i.e. specialized staff maintaining con-
tact with employers, 
5) Subcontracting of placement services to private providers. 
Table 4 provides a more detailed description of the organizational features (measured in 
2006) and outlines some arguments as to why they could affect the integration success of wel-
fare recipients. Customer segmentation and, in particular, generalized case management tend 
to be used much more frequently by decentralized agencies, integration of activation and 
placement is slightly more common among centralized agencies, while the other two strate-
gies are not related to agency type. 
< Include Table 4 about here > 
To check whether the effect of decentralized agencies can be attributed to one of these 
strategies, we require a multivariate framework. For this purpose, we use binary probit mod-
els. The probit estimations contain all covariates used in the preferred specification of the 
propensity score (see above). In addition, dummy variables for decentralized welfare agencies 
and for each of the organizational features are included. Furthermore, we include the interac-
tion of the organizational variables with the type of agency. We then test whether a significant 
effect of decentralized agencies on employment without welfare receipt remains despite con-
trolling for organization. 
Therefore, the estimated model is 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 1(𝛼1𝐷𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑘𝐵𝑗𝑘 + 𝛼3𝑘𝐵𝑗𝑘𝐷 + 𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + 𝑅𝑗′𝛾), 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the dependent variable for individual i in agency j at time t, 𝐷𝑗 is a dummy indi-
cating whether agency j is decentralized, 𝐵𝑗𝑘 is the k-th organizational variable (𝑘 = 1, … ,5), 
𝑋𝑖  is a vector of individual characteristics (including a constant) and 𝑅𝑗  is a vector of re-
gional characteristics. The function 1( ) indicates that the dependent variable is binary. 
<Include Table 5 about here> 
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Table 5 displays our estimation results for April, August and December, 2007. The 
standard errors account for potential clustering of error terms at agency level (see e.g. 
Moulton, 1986; 1990). The entries in the table are marginal effects of the dummy variables on 
the outcome variable, and their magnitudes and treatment effects from matching are, there-
fore, comparable. Since results did not differ much between randomly chosen individuals and 
single or non-single households, we rely on the overall samples of men and women. 
Similar to the matching results, we tend to find a negative effect of decentralization for 
men. The main effect is significant for at least one period for four out of five specifications. 
The main effects of the organizational variables are, with the exception of those of the em-
ployer service, never significant. There is a (weakly significant) negative interaction effect for 
integration of activation and placement with decentralization, suggesting that decentralized 
agencies which integrated these functions perform worse than centralized agencies. Another 
significant interaction is with the employer service. The positive sign implies that decentral-
ized agencies with an employer service performed better than those without. Importantly, in 
both cases it is not the typical organizational feature of decentralized agencies (i.e. not inte-
grating activation and placement, as well as having an employer service) that explain their 
inferior performance.   
Among women, the effects of decentralization, organizational strategies, and interaction 
terms are insignificant for four out of five organizational variables. Only if controlling for 
employer service, all three factors are significant: decentralization and employer service have 
a negative impact on employment, but the interaction between employer service and decen-
tralization is strongly positive. This indicates that, as in the case of men, the effect of an em-
ployer service offsets the negative effect of decentralization. A possible reason why an em-
ployer service is valuable for decentralized agencies is that this division strengthens their 
competences in the area of job placement where they have less previous experience than the 
centralized agencies.23  
As a further robustness analysis, we included all organizational variables jointly into the 
specification (without interaction terms).24 Again, the effect of decentralization for men re-
mained significantly negative at least over some part of the observation period, while the ef-
fect for women was insignificant. None of the organizational variables had a significant im-
                                              
23 More discussion on the role of the employer service in centralized and decentralized agencies can be found in 
WZB et al. (2008), p. 214ff. 
24 Results are available on request from the authors.  
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pact, with the exception of the employer service in case of women. All in all, we conclude 
that the effect of organization of welfare agencies is not due to the adoption of particular 
forms of internal organization. A more likely explanation of the difference in effects relates to 
the theoretical argumentation. The advantages of centralized organization in bundling re-
sources, collecting information from various sources, and imposing best-practice strategies for 
the local offices tend to outperform the favorable properties of decentralized organization.25 
 
7  Conclusions 
The German welfare reform of 2005 introduced two competing organizational systems for the 
labor market activation of welfare recipients in an otherwise homogenous institutional setting: 
decentralized and centralized welfare agencies. In order to evaluate their relative performance, 
we have estimated their effect on the integration of welfare recipients into employment with-
out welfare receipt, regarding regional differences as well as individual selection. The estima-
tion is based on exceptionally rich data from various sources. We have combined a detailed 
survey of welfare recipients with administrative records from the Federal Employment Agen-
cy (FEA). In addition, we have used a large set of variables that describe the local labor mar-
ket. Finally, we have considered unique information on the internal organization of the wel-
fare agencies in our sample. 
We find that decentralized welfare agencies have a negative effect on male welfare re-
cipients with respect to integration into employment. Given the low transition intensity from 
welfare receipt into employment in general, the magnitudes of the effects for men are substan-
tial. The integration quota of decentralized welfare agencies is up to 24% lower than the quota 
of centralized agencies. For women, we also find negative treatment effects, which are, how-
ever, smaller in magnitude than for men and which are not statistically significant. Gender 
differences are found within all subgroups considered (randomly chosen individuals, singles, 
and non-singles). These might result from different activation intensity between men and 
women. Evidence suggests that, irrespective of agency type, the activation intensity of women 
                                              
25 The use of ALMP measures (public employment schemes, short-term training and qualification measures) by 
centralized and decentralized agencies has also been investigated (ZEW et al. 2008). The probability of partici-
pation in these measures did not differ much with centralization, although centralized agencies used slightly 
more public employment schemes and decentralized agencies tended to give programs more frequently to wom-
en, lone mothers and young individuals than centralized agencies. The estimated treatment effects did not differ 
substantially between centralized and decentralized agencies. Therefore, we have little indication that the differ-
ent intensity or effectiveness of ALMP programs is behind the effect of centralization. 
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is far lower compared to men. If welfare agencies concentrate their activation efforts predom-
inantly on men rather than on women, it is harder to uncover significant differences in the 
relative performance of decentralized and centralized agencies for the latter subgroup. 
We have further explored channels through which our results may have emerged. Be-
cause welfare agencies have significant discretionary power with respect to internal organiza-
tion, we have checked whether the organization of tasks at individual welfare agencies is re-
sponsible for the result of decentralization. Although the effects are slightly weakened by the 
inclusion of the additional organizational strategies, the overall result is not affected. We con-
clude that the negative effect of decentralization is not due to differences in the adoption of 
strategies between centralized and decentralized welfare agencies and is not subject to their 
choices regarding the internal organization of tasks. The remaining differences are related to 
the very nature of (de)centralized organization. Examples are the application of central best 
practice guidelines of the FEA concerning the use of instruments of activation, as well as the 
(de)centralized controlling system.  
This is the first paper that provides quantitative evidence on the effects of 
(de)centralization of public welfare on employment transitions. Our findings point to the im-
portance of the organizational aspects of welfare administration to the integration of welfare 
recipients into employment. Despite their importance, this topic has been largely neglected by 
existing literature on employment policy. Identifying successful and less successful strategies 
for the organization of welfare administration remains a difficult yet highly relevant task. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Organizational Features of Decentralized and Centralized Welfare Agencies 
  Decentralized Agencies Centralized Agencies 
Number of Entities 69 370 
Legal Form Part of local administration Part of FEA, but is a sepa-
rate legal entity 
Organizational Affiliation Local authorities Joint venture between local 
employment office of the 
FEA and local authorities 
Main Source of Financing Federal government Federal government 
Centralized Standards of FEA Not binding, although legal 
restrictions exist 
Binding for job placement, 
provision of ALMP, moni-
toring of efforts 
Software Specific solutions for each 
local authority 
Standard system of FEA  
Remarks: The numbers of decentralized and centralized welfare agencies presented here 
refer to October 2006 and are based on the 439 German districts at this time. 
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Table 2: Overview on Characteristics Included in the Analysis 
Basic socio-
demographic 
information 
age (18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, and 45 to 57 years), schooling (secondary general school, 
intermediate secondary school, university entrance diploma, other), migration background, 
household size (1 person, 2 persons, 3 or more persons), no. of children (no children, 1 child, 
2 or more children) 
Obstacles to 
employment 
disability, care obligation 
Labor market 
and employment 
history 
status before welfare receipt ((minor) employment), no. of half-months unemployed in 2004, 
no. of half-months unemployed in 2003, no. of half-months unemployed in 2002, no. of half-
months unemployed in 2001, no. of half-months out of labor force from 2001 to 2004, mean 
duration out of labor force from 2003 to 2004 in half-months, no. of programs from 2003 to 
2004, mean duration of programs from 2003 to 2004 in half-months 
Current welfare 
spell 
months in welfare before 10/2006, start after 10/2006 or missing 
Regional infor-
mation 
unemployment ratio (binary), urban district, GDP per employed person (binary), population 
density (binary), labor market conditions (above average, on average, below average), East 
Germany 
Further socio-
demographic 
variables 
at least one child aged below 3 in the household, lone parent status, vocational qualification 
(none, in-firm training, off-the-job training, university degree, other), self-assessment of 
overall state of health (good, satisfactory, poor), impairments to health (gastro-intestinal 
diseases, cardiovascular diseases, rheumatism and other articular trouble, sleep disorders, 
nervous disorders, allergies, back complaint, other complaints, no health problems), self-
assessment of daily working capacity (less than 3 hours, 3 to 6 hours, 6 to 8 hours, 8 or more 
hours), self-assessment of basic skills (reading and writing in mother tongue, mathematics, 
emails and internet), driver's license 
Further infor-
mation on the 
labor market 
history from 
2001 to 2004 
no. of half-months employed in 2004, no. of half-months employed in 2003, no. of half-
months employed in 2002, no. of half-months employed in 2001, no. of half-months seeking 
for a job while employed in 2004, no. of half-months seeking for a job while employed in 
2003, no. of half-months seeking for a job while employed in 2002, no. of half-months seek-
ing for a job while employed in 2001, no. of half-months in a program in 2004, no. of half-
months in a program in 2003, no. of half-months in a program in 2002, no. of half-months in 
a program in 2001, no. of employment spells in 2004, no. of employment spells in 2003, no. 
of employment spells in 2002, no. of employment spells in 2001,  
no. of unemployment spells in 2004, no. of unemployment spells in 2003, no. of unemploy-
ment spells in 2002, no. of unemployment spells in 2001, no. of spells of job seeking while 
employed in 2004, no. of spells of job seeking while employed in 2003, no. of spells of job 
seeking while employed in 2002, no. of spells of job seeking while employed in 2001, no. of 
programs in 2002, no. of programs in 2001, no. of spells out of labor force in 2004, no. of 
spells out of labor force in 2003, no. of spells out of labor force in 2002, no. of spells out of 
labor force in 2001 
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Table 3: Indicators for Matching Quality 
  Men Women 
Before Matching 
McFadden-R2 0.047 0.046 
LR-Test 373.480 414.750 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
Mean standardized difference in percent  6.309 6.648 
After Matching 
McFadden-R2 0.001 0.002 
LR-Test 3.720 10.670 
p-value 1.000 0.997 
Mean standardized difference in percent  1.003 1.271 
Smith and Todd (2005) balancing test 
p-values > 0,05 21 18 
p-values > 0,01 23 20 
Remarks: McFadden-R2 derives from a probit estimation of the propensity score on 
all covariates considered. The LR-statistic and the corresponding p-value derive from 
a likelihood-ratio test of the joint insignificance of all covariates. The mean standard-
ized difference in percent has been calculated as an unweighted average of all co-
variates. The Smith-Todd test displays the number of covariates passing the test at 
the indicated significance level. There are 26 covariates included in the preferred 
specification. 
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Table 4: Definition of Organizational Variables 
Definition Possible Impact on Integration Frequency in Sample 
Generalized Case Management 
Case managers counsel all types of 
clients. There is no assignment of 
welfare recipients with multiple 
obstacles to employment to spe-
cialist caseworkers.  
Better placement under specialized 
case management if clients with 
specific problems require special-
ized expertise. Generalized case 
management facilitates individual 
counseling as clients have fewer 
contact persons.  
0.69 (decentralized agencies) 
0.24 (centralized agencies)  
Integration of Activation and Placement 
Clients are counseled (activated) 
and placed into employment by the 
same staff members. There is no 
assignment of specialized staff to 
the two tasks.  
Integration reduces the number of 
contact persons for each welfare 
recipient, and facilitates a holistic 
approach. In contrast, separation 
leads to gains from specialization 
but may create coordination prob-
lems at the interface of both tasks. 
0.51 (decentralized) 
0.59 (centralized) 
Customer Segmentation 
Classification of clients into differ-
ent groups receiving different 
treatment during activation.  
Segmentation may increase em-
ployment rates among groups that 
are activated more intensely but 
reduces integration into employ-
ment in other groups. 
0.84 (decentralized) 
0.66 (centralized) 
Employer Service 
A team of agency staff members 
maintains a network with employ-
ers and serves as contact persons 
for them. 
Networking may result in better 
placement. However, internal co-
ordination problems between the 
employer service and caseworkers 
may arise.  
0.86 (decentralized) 
0.83 (centralized) 
Subcontracting of Placement Services 
The welfare agency uses private 
employment services to place some 
of their clients into employment.  
Specialization gains may occur. 
However, private agencies may 
work more or less effectively com-
pared to the public employment 
service. Requires proper assign-
ment of welfare recipients to ser-
vice providers. 
0.41 (decentralized) 
0.40 (centralized) 
Remarks: The organizational variables were obtained from surveys conducted in 2006. 
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Table 5: Probit Estimations for the Effects of Organizational Features  
 
Men Women 
 April August December April August December 
Decentralized welfare 
agency 
-0.0188** -0.0259 -0.0286 -0.0122 -0.0098 -0.0037 
(0.0089) (0.0162) (0.0180) (0.0081) (0.0091) (0.0160) 
Generalized case manage-
ment 
-0.0021 -0.0016 -0.0205 -0.0097 0.0014 0.0054 
(0.0085) (0.0128) (0.0135) (0.0068) (0.0090) (0.0119) 
Interaction 0.0169 0.0016 0.0302 0.0122 0.0050 -0.0047 
(0.0156) (0.0234) (0.0273) (0.0131) (0.0141) (0.0205) 
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.067 0.069 0.080 0.077 0.070 
Log-Likelihood -1,559.49 -2,369.25 -2,572.02 -1,361.18 -1,841.04 -2,145.60 
Decentralized welfare 
agency 
-0.0092 -0.0116 -0.0100 -0.0131* -0.0056 -0.0023 
(0.0095) (0.0148) (0.0177) (0.0072) (0.0096) (0.0126) 
Integration of activation and 
placement 
0.0010 0.0062 0.0024 0.0003 0.0100 0.0036 
(0.0072) (0.0104) (0.0124) (0.0069) (0.0086) (0.0102) 
Interaction -0.0010 -0.0333* -0.0214 0.0094 0.0017 -0.0043 
(0.0135) (0.0184) (0.0230) (0.0134) (0.0149) (0.0190) 
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.067 0.069 0.079 0.078 0.070 
Log-Likelihood -1,560.25 -2,367.33 -2,572.65 -1,361.56 -1,839.62 -2,145.65 
Decentralized welfare 
agency 
-0.0281** -0.0408** -0.0253 -0.0055 0.0020 0.0028 
(0.0132) (0.0197) (0.0191) (0.0120) (0.0141) (0.0172) 
Customer segmentation -0.0041 -0.0126 0.0037 0.0012 -0.0034 0.0043 
(0.0075) (0.0104) (0.0126) (0.0071) (0.0088) (0.0098) 
Interaction 0.0258 0.0224 0.0075 -0.0050 -0.0087 -0.0093 
(0.0192) (0.0259) (0.0249) (0.0137) (0.0154) (0.0195) 
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.067 0.068 0.079 0.077 0.070 
Log-Likelihood -1,559.27 -2,368.53 -2,573.21 -1,362.06 -1,840.72 -2,145.57 
Decentralized welfare 
agency 
-0.0139 -0.0652*** -0.0778*** -0.0320*** -0.0536*** -0.0569** 
(0.0136) (0.0235) (0.0289) (0.0107) (0.0140) (0.0223) 
Employer service -0.0099 -0.0094 -0.0374** -0.0216** -0.0313*** -0.0431*** 
(0.0096) (0.0142) (0.0186) (0.0110) (0.0104) (0.0135) 
Interaction 0.0059 0.0540 0.0831** 0.0349* 0.0730*** 0.0779** 
(0.0172) (0.0332) (0.0416) (0.0181) (0.0247) (0.0353) 
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.067 0.070 0.082 0.080 0.074 
Log-Likelihood -1,559.71 -2,367.31 -2,568.55 -1,358.12 -1,834.12 -2,137.17 
Decentralized welfare 
agency 
-0.0150** -0.0271** -0.0252* -0.0038 -0.0023 0.0066 
(0.0074) (0.0110) (0.0137) (0.0065) (0.0078) (0.0106) 
Subcontracting of placement 
services 
-0.0056 0.0008 -0.0065 -0.0003 0.0014 0.0029 
(0.0069) (0.0111) (0.0131) (0.0073) (0.0088) (0.0109) 
Interaction 0.0156 0.0040 0.0181 -0.0146 -0.0096 -0.0273* 
(0.0160) (0.0245) (0.0293) (0.0098) (0.0138) (0.0154) 
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.067 0.068 0.080 0.077 0.071 
Log-Likelihood -1,559.64 -2,369.21 -2,572.99 -1,360.37 -1,840.88 -2,143.16 
Remarks: The table shows the results of 5 separate probit estimations. In the models, we include an interaction 
term between the respective organizational variable and decentralization. The table shows marginal effects and 
standard errors (in brackets). *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05 and * denotes p<0.1. The dependent varia-
ble in each model and for each month is 1 if an individual is employed and does not receive welfare benefits and 
0 otherwise. Number of observations for  men (women): 6,217 (6,992). One centralized welfare agency had to be 
dropped from the analysis due to missing information. Standard errors take into account clustering at agency 
level. All models include the covariates used in the preferred propensity score specification of the matching 
analysis; detailed results are available from the authors on request. All results refer to the year 2007.  
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Figures 
Figure 1: Means of the Outcome Variable “Employment Without Welfare Receipt” 
 
Note: Displayed results for 2007; sampling date: October 2006. All sampled persons are receiving 
welfare benefits at sampling date.  
 
 
Figure 2: Estimated Treatment Effects on Employment, Men 
 
Notes:  ♦ indicates significance at the 5% level, ◊ significance at the 10% level; displayed results for 
2007; sampling date: October 2006. 
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Figure 3: Estimated Treatment Effects on Employment, Women 
 
Notes:  ♦ indicates significance at the 5% level, ◊ significance at the 10% level; displayed results for 
2007; sampling date: October 2006. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Treatment Effects on Employment, Singles and Non-singles, Men 
 
Notes:  ♦ indicates significance at the 5% level, ◊ significance at the 10% level; displayed results for 
2007; sampling date: October 2006. 
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Figure 5: Treatment Effects on Employment, Singles and Non-singles, Women 
 
Notes:  ♦ indicates significance at the 5% level, ◊ significance at the 10% level; displayed results for 
2007; sampling date: October 2006. 
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Appendix 1: Map of the 154 Welfare Agencies in the Sample 
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Appendix 2: Balancing of Regional Variables Among the Sampled Welfare Agencies    
  
Centralized 
agencies 
Decentra-
lized           
agencies 
p-value 
(equality-
of-means 
test)  
p-value 
(Kolmogo-
rov-
Smirnov 
test) 
Unemployment rate (Source: FEA) 11.309 11.412 0.906 0.868 
Unemployment rate of the young (age < 25) (Source: FEA) 10.628 10.505 0.860 0.999 
Unemployment rate of foreigners (Source: FEA) 23.285 24.340 0.567 0.959 
Ratio of caseworkers to unemployed (classified) 0.016 0.016 0.837 0.574 
Ratio of placement officers with fixed-term contract  to 
unemployed 0.002 0.002 0.895 0.844 
Ratio of young (< 25) to old (> 50) unemployed (in percent) 49.478 50.966 0.339 0.538 
Ratio of severely disabled unemployed to all unemployed 0.040 0.039 0.809 0.979 
Ratio of long-term unemployed to all unemployed 0.332 0.333 0.893 0.872 
Rate of social assistance recipients 0.036 0.028 0.004 0.013 
Unemployment-Vacancy (UV) relation in textile industry 73.592 84.213 0.301 0.712 
UV relation in construction sector 37.124 35.640 0.702 0.960 
UV relation in engineering 16.267 17.857 0.567 0.395 
UV relation in commerce sector 24.820 27.332 0.462 0.626 
UV relation in service sector 20.753 24.232 0.212 0.720 
UV relation in metal industry 15.261 14.610 0.661 0.998 
UV relation in healthcare 6.346 6.356 0.983 0.572 
UV relation in social sector 11.433 11.121 0.728 0.600 
UV relation overall 30.208 32.386 0.471 0.770 
FF per unemployed 0.007 0.009 0.408 0.939 
FF per male unemployed 0.008 0.010 0.479 0.947 
FF per female unemployed 0.006 0.008 0.337 0.361 
FF per unemployed over age 50 0.004 0.005 0.405 0.855 
FF per unemployed under age 25 0.014 0.019 0.253 0.511 
Employer wage subsidies per unemployed 0.032 0.033 0.753 0.076 
Employer wage subsidies per unemployed over age 50 0.062 0.065 0.763 0.591 
Employer wage subsidies for long-term unemployed per 
unemployed 0.002 0.003 0.168 0.039 
Employer wage subsidies for long-term unemployed per 
male unemployed 0.002 0.003 0.149 0.172 
Employer wage subsidies for long-term unemployed per 
female unemployed 0.002 0.003 0.131 0.021 
Start-up grants per unemployed over age 50 0.008 0.009 0.638 0.509 
Start-up grants per unemployed under age 25 0.008 0.007 0.735 0.896 
ABM/unemployed+ABM 0.017 0.019 0.430 0.890 
ABM/unemployed+ABM (women) 0.016 0.018 0.488 0.412 
ABM/unemployed+ABM (men) 0.017 0.020 0.389 0.812 
FbW/(unemployed+FbW) 0.058 0.060 0.205 0.593 
FbW/(unemployed+FbW) (men) 0.049 0.052 0.310 0.268 
FbW/(unemployed+FbW) (women) 0.069 0.071 0.264 0.386 
FbW/(unemployed+FbW) (age > 50) 0.014 0.015 0.360 0.093 
FbW/(unemployed+FbW) (age < 25) 0.054 0.055 0.741 0.945 
TM/(unemployed+TM) 0.022 0.022 0.637 0.419 
TM/(unemployed+TM) (women) 0.023 0.023 0.763 0.610 
TM/(unemployed+TM) (men) 0.022 0.021 0.539 0.341 
TM/(unemployed+TM) (age > 50) 0.010 0.010 0.883 0.223 
TM/(unemployed+TM) (age < 25) 0.036 0.035 0.828 0.813 
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JUMP per unemployed (age <25) 0.121 0.136 0.209 0.565 
Ratio of working population to resident population 0.465 0.424 0.075 0.098 
Ratio of persons employed (subject to ssc) to resident popu-
lation 0.320 0.322 0.535 0.855 
Ratio of persons employed (subject to ssc) to resident popu-
lation (men) 0.357 0.361 0.450 0.490 
Ratio of persons employed (subject to ssc) to resident popu-
lation (women) 0.284 0.285 0.823 0.884 
Commuter balance per 1000 employees -64.233 -172.431 0.034 0.051 
Business foundations per 10000 inhabitants aged 15 to 64  149.643 146.700 0.517 0.228 
GDP per economically active person (in 1,000 Euro) 51.657 51.343 0.826 0.602 
Ratio of foreigners to resident population 0.084 0.065 0.032 0.158 
Available infant care places per infant 0.637 0.655 0.339 0.518 
Available child care places per child 0.281 0.285 0.777 0.802 
Remarks: All variables are measured for December 2003. The depicted numbers refer to the 154 sampled welfare 
agencies. The p-values in the third column derive from equality-of-means tests of the displayed variables for cen-
tralized and decentralized agencies. The p-values in the rightmost column derive from Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
of the equality of distributions. FF denotes the number of participants in activation programs designed on the discre-
tion of the local employment offices (Freie Förderung). ABM stands for the number of participants in job creation 
schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen). FbW denotes the number of persons participating in long-term training 
(Förderung der beruflichen Weiterbildung), TM the number of persons participating in short-term training (Train-
ingsmaßnahmen), and JUMP the number of participants in a program for the activation of young unemployed per-
sons (Sofortprogramm der Bundesregierung zum Abbau der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit). ssc = social security contribu-
tions 
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Appendix 3: Means of Variables Included in the Propensity Score Specification Before (first row) and After (second row) Matching 
  Men Women     
  
Centralized 
agencies 
Decentralized 
agencies p-value 
Centralized 
agencies 
Decentralized 
agencies p-value Data source 
Propensity score 
specification 
Age                 
18 to 24 years 0.185 0.194 0.423 0.229 0.250 0.056 Survey 1 
0.185 0.186 0.922 0.231 0.231 0.980 
25 to 34 years 0.166 0.208 0.000 0.218 0.233 0.173 Survey 1 
0.166 0.168 0.848 0.217 0.221 0.767 
35 to 44 years 0.222 0.201 0.052 0.220 0.212 0.394 Survey 1 
0.221 0.219 0.872 0.220 0.216 0.749 
45 to 57 years 0.427 0.397 0.026 0.332 0.306 0.025 Survey 1 
0.427 0.426 0.931 0.332 0.332 0.999 
Schooling                  
Secondary general school 0.465 0.500 0.008 0.421 0.449 0.023 Survey 1 
0.465 0.472 0.622 0.423 0.425 0.921 
Intermediate secondary school 0.303 0.264 0.002 0.386 0.350 0.003 Survey 1 
0.303 0.297 0.690 0.384 0.378 0.664 
University entrance diploma 0.167 0.151 0.100 0.144 0.133 0.182 Survey 1 
0.167 0.164 0.804 0.144 0.146 0.869 
Other or missing 0.066 0.084 0.010 0.049 0.068 0.002 Survey 1 
0.066 0.067 0.907 0.049 0.052 0.633 
Migration background                  
Migrant 0.244 0.260 0.174 0.248 0.258 0.379 Survey 1 
0.244 0.249 0.725 0.248 0.255 0.575 
Household size                  
1 person 0.418 0.464 0.001 0.234 0.244 0.323 Survey 1 
0.418 0.422 0.816 0.233 0.236 0.771 
2 persons 0.203 0.182 0.045 0.353 0.342 0.351 Survey 1 
0.203 0.205 0.841 0.353 0.348 0.751 
3 or more persons 0.379 0.354 0.049 0.414 0.414 0.965 Survey 1 
0.379 0.373 0.687 0.414 0.415 0.955 
Number of children                  
  35 
No children 0.708 0.736 0.020 0.487 0.486 0.990 Survey 1 
0.708 0.714 0.672 0.485 0.490 0.746 
1 child 0.129 0.125 0.631 0.307 0.294 0.269 Survey 1 
0.129 0.130 0.925 0.308 0.304 0.775 
2 or more children 0.163 0.139 0.013 0.207 0.220 0.212 Survey 1 
0.163 0.156 0.542 0.207 0.206 0.941 
Obstacles to employment                 
Disabled 0.162 0.127 0.000 0.076 0.067 0.169 Survey 1 
0.161 0.159 0.820 0.075 0.076 0.949 
Care obligation 0.024 0.020 0.229 0.043 0.042 0.748 Survey 1 
0.024 0.024 0.983 0.043 0.044 0.893 
Status before welfare receipt                 
(Minor) employment 0.294 0.323 0.020 0.316 0.305 0.347 Survey 1 
0.294 0.298 0.800 0.317 0.311 0.652 
Labor market history from 2001 to 2004                 
Number of half-months unemployed in 2004 12.264 12.300 0.888 9.582 8.871 0.004 Admin 1 
12.272 12.252 0.948 9.563 9.566 0.991 
Number of half-months unemployed in 2003 10.215 10.307 0.728 7.973 7.118 0.000 Admin 1 
10.224 10.171 0.863 7.914 7.828 0.757 
Number of half-months unemployed in 2002 8.105 8.059 0.856 6.093 5.532 0.009 Admin 1 
8.107 7.997 0.707 6.048 5.982 0.795 
Number of half-months unemployed in 2001 6.346 6.275 0.757 5.171 4.556 0.002 Admin 1 
6.346 6.193 0.564 5.122 5.000 0.607 
Number of half-months out of labor force from 
2001 to 2004 
17.056 19.778 0.000 23.952 28.477 0.000 Admin 1 
17.072 17.411 0.678 24.110 24.433 0.714 
Mean duration out of labor force from 2003 to 2004 
in half-months 
4.393 5.208 0.006 7.117 9.048 0.000 Admin 1 
4.397 4.450 0.765 7.173 7.291 0.775 
Number of programs from 2003 to 2004 0.351 0.384 0.060 0.278 0.262 0.259 Admin 1 
0.351 0.361 0.608 0.274 0.274 0.978 
Mean duration of programs from 2003 to 2004 in 
half-months 
2.351 2.322 0.845 1.973 1.730 0.075 Admin 1 
2.354 2.366 0.946 1.917 1.941 0.883 
Current welfare spell                 
Months in welfare before 10/2006 13.862 13.757 0.659 14.532 14.595 0.770 Survey 1 
13.861 13.747 0.678 14.539 14.485 0.829 
Start after 10/2006 or missing 0.158 0.157 0.965 0.129 0.126 0.721 Survey 1 
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0.158 0.158 0.998 0.128 0.126 0.827 
Regional information                 
Unemployment ratio (high) 0.250 0.223 0.017 0.282 0.231 0.000 Regional 1 
0.250 0.236 0.278 0.279 0.264 0.261 
Urban district 0.167 0.369 0.000 0.163 0.371 0.000 Regional 1 
0.167 0.164 0.849 0.165 0.165 0.962 
Further regional variables                 
GDP per employed person (high) 0.265 0.308 0.001 0.262 0.320 0.000 Regional 2 
0.266 0.300 0.013 0.263 0.299 0.005 
Population density (high) 0.210 0.393 0.000 0.205 0.392 0.000 Regional 2 
0.210 0.209 0.972 0.207 0.211 0.704 
Labor market conditions above average 0.358 0.284 0.000 0.346 0.304 0.000 Regional 2 
0.358 0.373 0.309 0.347 0.367 0.141 
Labor market conditions on average 0.311 0.315 0.750 0.318 0.304 0.233 Regional 2 
0.312 0.284 0.051 0.315 0.278 0.006 
Labor market conditions below average 0.331 0.388 0.000 0.336 0.382 0.000 Regional 2 
0.331 0.338 0.612 0.339 0.350 0.395 
East Germany 0.262 0.212 0.000 0.294 0.223 0.000 Regional 2 
0.262 0.247 0.283 0.290 0.277 0.312 
Further sociodemographic variables                 
At least one child aged below 3 in the household  0.115 0.108 0.460 0.180 0.165 0.101 Survey 3 
0.115 0.113 0.889 0.180 0.182 0.900 
Lone parent status 0.023 0.019 0.300 0.295 0.299 0.752 Survey 3 
0.023 0.022 0.938 0.296 0.291 0.720 
Professional qualification                 
None 0.229 0.272 0.000 0.272 0.327 0.000 Survey 3 
0.230 0.232 0.858 0.274 0.274 0.987 
In-firm training 0.464 0.456 0.548 0.425 0.387 0.002 Survey 3 
0.465 0.465 0.986 0.423 0.423 0.998 
Off-the-job training 0.174 0.153 0.032 0.208 0.185 0.018 Survey 3 
0.174 0.175 0.967 0.208 0.205 0.807 
University degree 0.071 0.067 0.613 0.053 0.061 0.197 Survey 3 
0.071 0.069 0.837 0.054 0.056 0.783 
Other or missing 0.061 0.052 0.103 0.042 0.041 0.870 Survey 3 
0.061 0.059 0.839 0.042 0.042 0.891 
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Self-assessment of overall state of health                 
Good 0.556 0.576 0.130 0.593 0.620 0.029 Survey 3 
0.557 0.558 0.956 0.596 0.593 0.853 
Satisfactory 0.245 0.235 0.346 0.230 0.210 0.048 Survey 3 
0.245 0.241 0.778 0.228 0.227 0.969 
Poor 0.194 0.186 0.440 0.175 0.168 0.511 Survey 3 
0.194 0.197 0.825 0.175 0.178 0.778 
Missing 0.004 0.003 0.430 0.002 0.002 0.896 Survey 3 
0.004 0.005 0.935 0.002 0.002 0.996 
Impairments to health                 
Gastro-intestinal diseases 0.152 0.155 0.701 0.152 0.176 0.010 Survey 3 
0.152 0.156 0.691 0.153 0.152 0.964 
Cardiovascular diseases 0.175 0.190 0.150 0.217 0.224 0.495 Survey 3 
0.175 0.178 0.856 0.217 0.218 0.925 
Rheumatism and other articular trouble 0.288 0.288 0.971 0.261 0.247 0.198 Survey 3 
0.289 0.287 0.913 0.259 0.263 0.767 
Sleep disorders 0.230 0.244 0.222 0.260 0.280 0.062 Survey 3 
0.230 0.231 0.946 0.262 0.264 0.837 
Nervous disorders 0.171 0.177 0.585 0.224 0.232 0.454 Survey 3 
0.172 0.173 0.872 0.223 0.223 0.994 
Allergies 0.173 0.168 0.608 0.252 0.272 0.077 Survey 3 
0.173 0.171 0.887 0.254 0.252 0.890 
Back complaint 0.418 0.405 0.340 0.423 0.414 0.468 Survey 3 
0.418 0.415 0.858 0.422 0.422 0.973 
Other complaints 0.048 0.045 0.583 0.040 0.037 0.437 Survey 3 
0.048 0.050 0.846 0.040 0.040 0.998 
No health problems 0.282 0.289 0.550 0.273 0.257 0.158 Survey 3 
0.281 0.288 0.669 0.273 0.257 0.217 
Self-assessment of daily working capacity                 
Less than 3 hours 0.042 0.041 0.908 0.039 0.044 0.377 Survey 3 
0.042 0.043 0.781 0.039 0.041 0.737 
3 to 6 hours 0.077 0.076 0.794 0.183 0.178 0.643 Survey 3 
0.078 0.077 0.987 0.183 0.182 0.966 
6 to 8 hours 0.131 0.124 0.437 0.235 0.223 0.232 Survey 3 
0.130 0.128 0.859 0.234 0.231 0.749 
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8 or more hours 0.706 0.726 0.105 0.514 0.528 0.269 Survey 3 
0.706 0.708 0.925 0.514 0.518 0.821 
Missing 0.044 0.034 0.045 0.029 0.028 0.754 Survey 3 
0.044 0.043 0.863 0.029 0.028 0.869 
Self-assessment of basic skills measured from 1 (= very good) to 6 (= fail); Missings are set to 3,5         
Reading and Writing (in mother tongue) 2.121 2.080 0.138 1.920 1.885 0.155 Survey 3 
2.121 2.115 0.854 1.916 1.914 0.934 
Mathematics 2.370 2.326 0.108 2.549 2.595 0.090 Survey 3 
2.369 2.360 0.792 2.546 2.539 0.823 
Emails and Internet 2.993 2.984 0.845 3.113 3.079 0.415 Survey 3 
2.993 3.000 0.898 3.120 3.118 0.970 
Other skills                 
Driver's license 0.700 0.637 0.000 0.635 0.586 0.000 Survey 3 
0.700 0.695 0.744 0.634 0.635 0.954 
Further information on the labor market history from 2001 to 2004             
Number of half-months employed in 2004 4.645 4.516 0.531 5.260 5.232 0.894 Admin 3 
4.642 4.700 0.808 5.299 5.279 0.935 
Number of half-months employed in 2003 6.488 6.105 0.108 6.353 6.463 0.630 Admin 3 
6.484 6.574 0.751 6.406 6.396 0.970 
Number of half-months employed in 2002 7.784 7.539 0.343 7.284 7.507 0.355 Admin 3 
7.785 7.897 0.714 7.299 7.324 0.928 
Number of half-months employed in 2001 8.562 8.649 0.747 7.507 7.877 0.133 Admin 3 
8.570 8.680 0.724 7.550 7.621 0.801 
Number of half-months seeking for a job while 
employed in 2004 
0.467 0.479 0.831 0.442 0.517 0.182 Admin 3 
0.467 0.476 0.898 0.446 0.464 0.777 
Number of half-months seeking for a job while 
employed in 2003 
0.263 0.268 0.895 0.260 0.310 0.222 Admin 3 
0.263 0.260 0.948 0.261 0.266 0.907 
Number of half-months seeking for a job while 
employed in 2002 
0.199 0.209 0.795 0.188 0.173 0.634 Admin 3 
0.199 0.205 0.879 0.189 0.186 0.943 
Number of half-months seeking for a job while 
employed in 2001 
0.143 0.151 0.820 0.169 0.147 0.472 Admin 3 
0.143 0.141 0.952 0.166 0.153 0.709 
Number of half-months in a program in 2004 1.818 1.756 0.594 1.551 1.278 0.006 Admin 3 
1.819 1.809 0.939 1.498 1.494 0.970 
Number of half-months in a program in 2003 1.411 1.401 0.927 1.132 1.074 0.545 Admin 3 
1.413 1.412 0.994 1.103 1.148 0.685 
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Number of half-months in a program in 2002 1.459 1.529 0.562 1.387 1.188 0.055 Admin 3 
1.461 1.430 0.817 1.376 1.368 0.948 
Number of half-months in a program in 2001 1.527 1.507 0.867 1.394 1.150 0.018 Admin 3 
1.523 1.544 0.882 1.376 1.350 0.833 
Number of employment spells in 2004 0.306 0.310 0.779 0.298 0.316 0.168 Admin 3 
0.306 0.308 0.880 0.299 0.300 0.964 
Number of employment spells in 2003 0.216 0.240 0.075 0.168 0.199 0.007 Admin 3 
0.216 0.221 0.738 0.170 0.171 0.900 
Number of employment spells in 2002 0.232 0.244 0.389 0.219 0.234 0.222 Admin 3 
0.232 0.239 0.655 0.219 0.212 0.616 
Number of employment spells in 2001 0.282 0.296 0.366 0.225 0.258 0.011 Admin 3 
0.282 0.285 0.867 0.226 0.225 0.911 
Number of unemployment spells in 2004 0.764 0.802 0.035 0.588 0.590 0.906 Admin 3 
0.765 0.771 0.773 0.589 0.587 0.912 
Number of unemployment spells in 2003 0.339 0.384 0.008 0.252 0.265 0.322 Admin 3 
0.339 0.347 0.668 0.252 0.256 0.773 
Number of unemployment spells in 2002 0.361 0.405 0.011 0.270 0.279 0.551 Admin 3 
0.360 0.376 0.432 0.269 0.265 0.783 
Number of unemployment spells in 2001 0.348 0.366 0.292 0.256 0.249 0.597 Admin 3 
0.348 0.344 0.818 0.253 0.247 0.717 
Number of spells of job seeking while employed in 
2004 
0.081 0.098 0.052 0.077 0.089 0.094 Admin 3 
0.081 0.082 0.947 0.077 0.079 0.884 
Number of spells of job seeking while employed in 
2003 
0.065 0.059 0.410 0.054 0.058 0.540 Admin 3 
0.065 0.065 0.966 0.055 0.054 0.940 
Number of spells of job seeking while employed in 
2002 
0.050 0.047 0.610 0.042 0.038 0.454 Admin 3 
0.050 0.054 0.665 0.042 0.044 0.808 
Number of spells of job seeking while employed in 
2001 
0.030 0.033 0.505 0.040 0.033 0.106 Admin 3 
0.030 0.030 0.955 0.039 0.039 0.956 
Number of programs in 2002 0.142 0.125 0.092 0.114 0.094 0.022 Admin 3 
0.142 0.140 0.842 0.112 0.110 0.837 
Number of programs in 2001 0.122 0.121 0.950 0.122 0.088 0.000 Admin 3 
0.122 0.121 0.935 0.117 0.113 0.750 
Number of spells out of labor force in 2004 0.222 0.262 0.003 0.253 0.326 0.000 Admin 3 
0.222 0.223 0.956 0.254 0.257 0.856 
Number of spells out of labor force in 2003 0.168 0.214 0.000 0.145 0.172 0.011 Admin 3 
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0.168 0.171 0.849 0.145 0.149 0.726 
Number of spells out of labor force in 2002 0.189 0.218 0.026 0.173 0.191 0.119 Admin 3 
0.189 0.197 0.596 0.175 0.169 0.659 
Number of spells out of labor force in 2001 0.175 0.218 0.001 0.150 0.195 0.000 Admin 3 
0.175 0.178 0.852 0.151 0.155 0.701 
Observations before matching 2066 4194   2423 4603       
Observations of the matched sample 2064 4194   2401 4603       
Remarks: The p-values derive from t-tests on equality of means of the displayed variables for individuals in centralized and decentralized agencies before (first row) and after (second row) matching. 
The data sources for the variables are the survey of welfare recipients (Survey), administrative data of the Federal Employment Agency (Admin) and regional data (Regional). Variables marked by 1 in 
the final column of the table are included in the preferred specification of the propensity score as well as in the sensitivity analyses. Variables indicated by 2 are used for the propensity score specifica-
tions in the sensitivity analyses with additional regional variables. Variables marked by 3 are only included in the propensity score specification in the sensitivity analysis with all covariates. The dis-
played means and the number of obsevations after matching refer to this specification with all covariates. Due to the common support restriction, 2 individuals in centralized agencies in the sample of 
men and 21 individuals in centralized agencies in the sample of women had to be excluded from the matching analysis. The macroeconomic variables (unemployment ratio, GDP per employed person, 
population density) are binary dummy variables. They are measured in December 2003 and have been collected for all 439 German districts. Districts that face an unemployment ratio larger than the 75th 
percentile of all unemployment ratios across districts (agencies) are considered to be districts (agencies) with a high unemployment ratio and individuals registered at these agencies are classified respec-
tively. The same procedure applies for GDP and population density. The classification of labor market conditions (above average, on average, below average) is based on the results of Arntz et al. 
(2006). The upper tercile of districts, which face the best economic conditions with respect to the regional variables relevant for labor market transitions of the long-term unemployed, are classified to 
have above average labor market conditions. The middle tercile of districts is subsumed to have average labor market conditions, and the lower tercile has below average conditions. 
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Appendix 4: Preferred Propensity Score Specifications 
  Total sample Singles Nonsingles 
  Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Age (reference: 25 to 34 years)         
18 to 24 years 0.0433** -0.0017 0.0379 0.0674 0.0323 -0.0161 
(0.0220) (0.0199) (0.0344) (0.0430) (0.0311) (0.0215) 
35 to 44 years 0.0551*** 0.0042 0.0542* -0.0080 0.0559** 0.0069 
(0.0205) (0.0188) (0.0284) (0.0484) (0.0262) (0.0194) 
45 to 57 years 0.0527*** 0.0166 0.0571** -0.0021 0.0444 0.0294 
(0.0184) (0.0199) (0.0270) (0.0369) (0.0279) (0.0216) 
Schooling (reference: secondary general school)         
Intermediate secondary school 0.0376** 0.0147 0.0370 0.0136 0.0356* 0.0144 
(0.0171) (0.0184) (0.0257) (0.0325) (0.0210) (0.0203) 
University entrance diploma 0.0642*** 0.0440 0.0765*** 0.0701 0.0529* 0.0350 
(0.0200) (0.0301) (0.0281) (0.0543) (0.0274) (0.0310) 
Other or missing -0.0164 -0.0458* 0.0203 -0.0034 -0.0404 -0.0562** 
(0.0231) (0.0239) (0.0323) (0.0661) (0.0354) (0.0261) 
Migration background (reference: non-migrants)         
Migrant 0.0025 0.0334 -0.0073 0.0565 0.0047 0.0301 
(0.0241) (0.0262) (0.0299) (0.0458) (0.0273) (0.0260) 
Household size (reference: 2 persons)         
1 person -0.0239 -0.0024     
(0.0175) (0.0198)     
3 or more persons -0.0281 0.0058     
(0.0267) (0.0184)         
Number of children (reference: 1 child)         
No children -0.0270 -0.0224   -0.0091 -0.0244 
(0.0266) (0.0188)   (0.0214) (0.0196) 
2 or more children 0.0341 -0.0149   0.0284 -0.0136 
(0.0227) (0.0181)     (0.0232) (0.0165) 
Obstacles to employment         
Disabled 0.0539*** 0.0416 0.0278 0.1213*** 0.0796*** -0.0095 
(0.0179) (0.0261) (0.0229) (0.0384) (0.0255) (0.0332) 
Care obligation 0.0360 0.0184 -0.0427 0.0558 0.1051* 0.0102 
(0.0457) (0.0322) (0.0566) (0.0809) (0.0637) (0.0344) 
Status before welfare receipt         
(Minor) employment -0.0254* 0.0101 -0.0180 0.0527* -0.0303* -0.0057 
(0.0151) (0.0116) (0.0234) (0.0304) (0.0165) (0.0143) 
Labor market history from 2001 to 2004         
Number of half-months unemployed 
in 2004 
-0.0016* -0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0039** -0.0014 0.0004 
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
Number of half-months unemployed 
in 2003 
-0.0009 0.0013 -0.0000 0.0043** -0.0018 0.0001 
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0012) 
Number of half-months unemployed 
in 2002 
0.0003 -0.0008 0.0016 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0011 
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Number of half-months unemployed 
in 2001 
-0.0002 0.0005 -0.0013 0.0011 0.0009 0.0004 
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Number of half-months out of labor 
force from 2001 to 2004 
-0.0008** -0.0006* -0.0010** -0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0006 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Mean duration out of labor force 
from 2003 to 2004 in half-months 
-0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0005 
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0007) 
No. of programs from 2003 to 2004 -0.0238 -0.0074 -0.0412** -0.0122 -0.0043 -0.0048 
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 (0.0157) (0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0236) (0.0196) (0.0203) 
Mean duration of programs from 
2003 to 2004 in half-months 
0.0003 0.0009 -0.0002 0.0012 0.0004 0.0006 
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0015) 
Current welfare spell         
Months in welfare before 10/2006 0.0006 0.0000 0.0003 0.0043** 0.0009 -0.0014 
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Start after 10/2006 or missing 0.0278 0.0208 0.0202 0.1160** 0.0330 -0.0055 
(0.0247) (0.0266) (0.0367) (0.0527) (0.0317) (0.0311) 
Regional information         
Unemployment ratio (high) 0.0151 0.0427 0.0204 0.0429 0.0120 0.0405 
(0.0973) (0.1001) (0.0968) (0.1036) (0.1001) (0.1007) 
Urban district -0.2127** -0.2236** -0.1942** -0.2038** -0.2273*** -0.2319*** 
(0.0861) (0.0872) (0.0860) (0.0916) (0.0875) (0.0862) 
Observations 6,260 7,026 2,810 1,690 3,450 5,336 
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.046 0.044 0.051 0.050 0.049 
Log-Likelihood -3,783.36 -4,318.83 -1,656.71 -1,022.46 -2,118.80 -3,279.64 
Remarks: Displayed are marginal effects and standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is defined to be 1 if an 
individual is registered at a decentralized welfare agency. Otherwise, the variable is 0. The unemployment ratio variable 
is a binary dummy variable. It is measured in December 2003 and has been collected for all 439 German districts. Dis-
tricts that face an unemployment ratio larger than the 75th percentile of all unemployment ratios across districts (agen-
cies) are considered to be districts (agencies) with a high unemployment ratio and individuals registered at these agen-
cies are classified respectively. Singles are defined to be persons living on their own, while non-singles are individuals 
living together with at least one other person in the same household. Because of this definition, we have to drop the 
variables household size and number of children (in the household) for the propensity score estimation of singles. For 
non-singles, we have to drop the variable household size only. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05 and * denotes 
p<0.1. 
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Appendix 5: Indicators for Matching Quality, Singles 
  Men Women 
Before Matching 
McFadden-R2 0.044 0.051 
LR-Test 152.850 110.170 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
Mean standardized difference in percent  7.026 7.826 
After Matching 
McFadden-R2 0.001 0.001 
LR-Test 1.520 0.910 
p-value 1.000 1.000 
Mean standardized difference in percent 1.038 0.789 
Smith and Todd (2005) balancing test 
p-values > 0,05 20 18 
p-values > 0,01 20 22 
Remarks: McFadden-R2 derives from a probit estimation of the propensity score on all covariates 
considered. The LR-statistic and the corresponding p-value derive from a likelihood-ratio test of the 
joint insignificance of all covariates. The mean standardized difference in percent has been calculat-
ed as an unweighted average of all covariates. The Smith-Todd test displays the number of covari-
ates passing the test at the indicated significance level. There are 22 covariates included in the pre-
ferred specification. 
 
 
Appendix 6: Indicators for Matching Quality, Non-singles 
  Men Women 
Before Matching 
McFadden-R2 0.050 0.049 
LR-Test 224.190 337.040 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
Mean standardized difference in percent  6.594 7.761 
After Matching 
McFadden-R2 0.001 0.002 
LR-Test 3.340 8.650 
p-value 1.000 0.998 
Mean standardized difference in percent 1.353 1.228 
Smith and Todd (2005) balancing test 
p-values > 0,05 22 15 
p-values > 0,01 22 19 
Remarks: McFadden-R2 derives from a probit estimation of the propensity score on all covariates 
considered. The LR-statistic and the corresponding p-value derive from a likelihood-ratio test of the 
joint insignificance of all covariates. The mean standardized difference in percent has been calcu-
lated as an unweighted average of all covariates. The Smith-Todd test displays the number of co-
variates passing the test at the indicated significance level. There are 24 covariates included in the 
preferred specification. 
 
 
